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cept of an oral or written contract is erroneous. 4 The oral or written
statements do not constitute the contract. The contract is the agreement between the parties, that intangible known as the "meeting of
the minds." The oral and written statements are merely evidence of
this contract. Thus, when the agent puts his name on the writing, he
is creating evidence of rights and liabilities incurred by his principal,
but he is not creating any liability in himself. He is in no sense a
party to the contract. Therefore, when a court refuses to let him
introduce evidence of the agency in order to refute the evidence
posed by the writing with his signature on it, it is in the truest sense
making a new contract and changing the agreements of the parties.
CONCLUSION

Most courts refuse to allow an agent of a disclosed principal
to introduce evidence of the agency relationship in order to relieve
himself from liability on a contract. These decisions are inconsistent
with those cases which allow the introduction of extrinsic evidence of
the agency relationship to bind the principal or entitle him to sue
the signing third party. Moreover, they seem to be incorrect under
the Corbin analysis of the parol evidence rule, and contrary to
modem theories of the nature of contracts. The agent should be
allowed to introduce the agency in order to escape liability.
Robert R. Skinner

Constitutional Law-West Virginia's Distress for Rent LawA Landlord's Remedy vs. A Tenant's Protections.
The legal right of the landlord to distrain his tenant's personal
property for unpaid rent has been one of the landlord's common-law
34 Dean

Wigmore said:
[11n opposition to the popular and natural view which tends to thrust
itself forward at trials. ... a writing has no efficacy per se, but only
in consequence of and dependence upon other circumstances external
to itself. The exhibition of a writing is often made as though it
possessed some intrinsic and indefinite power of dominating the
situation and quelling further dispute. But it needs rather to be
remembered that a writing is, of itself alone considered, nothing,simply nothing.... There is no magic in the writing itself. It hangs
in midair, incapable of self-support, until some foundation of other
facts has been built for it." 9 J. WIGMORE, E.VMENcE § 2400, at
5 (3d ed. 1940).
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remedies for collection of rent in arrears since the ancient times of
feudal tenure. If the tenant became delinquent in the payment of
his rent, his lord could persuade payment by going on the premises
and seizing any chattels he might find. This power of "self-help"
stemmed from the landlord's feudal right to hold court in matters
against or involving his tenants.' While common-law distress for
rent in arrears afforded the landlord the extra-judicial power to
distrain a tenant's property without the royal court's approval or
assistance, the landlord's remedy to distrain his tenant's chattels for
rent in Virginia and West Virginia (as in most other states) is no
longer an act of "self-help" but a judicial action.' In light of recent
civil cases involving the question of procedural due process, the
statutory remedy of distress for rent in West Virginia may be a
violation of the tenant's constitutional right to due process of law.4
The unconstitutionality of the landlord's remedy of distress for
rent does not rest upon the substantive right of the landlord to
recover unpaid rent through the seizure and sale of the tenant's
personal property. The wrong of distraint of one's property for rent
in arrears would relate to the requirements of procedural due process,
i.e., the tenant's right to basic procedural protections before his goods
12 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 573-75
(2d ed. 1898). Jones v. Ford, 254 F. 645 (8th Cir. 1918); In re West Side
Paper2 Co., 162 F. 110 (3d Cir. 1908).
Although the landlord had the right to go on his tenant's property and
seize any personal property he might find regardless of ownership, this power
was not "self-satisfaction" because he could only hold the goods as a pledge
until the rent was paid and could not sell or use the levied goods. 2 F.
POLLOCK
& F. MArLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENoLISH LAw 574 (2d ed. 1898).
3
Wickham v. Richmond Standard Steel Spike & Iron Co., 107 Va. 44,
57 S.E. 647 (1907). The distress action in West Virginia has been held to be
an ex parte proceeding, not a civil action. Anderson v. Henry, 45 W. Va. 319,
31 S.E.
998 (1898).
4
There is some basis to support the theory that distraint of a tenant's
property may also constitute an unreasonable search and seizure. See, e.g.,
Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971)
(sheriff's search and seizure incident to the execution of a claim and delivery process is unreasonable if not made incident to a warrant issued by a
magistrate upon a showing of probable cause). See also Camaro v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (the fourth amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizures includes civil matters as well as criminal). But
see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (termination of public assistance
under New Yorks Aid to Families with Dependent Children program because
the recipient refused to permit a case worker a home visitation was held not
to violate any constitutional rights).

Under West Virginia's distress for rent law, the officer with the distress

warrant may, if necessary, forceably enter the house in the daytime to seize
the goods. He may also break and enter anytime into a house containing
goods to be levied upon, which have been fraudulently removed from the
leased property. W. VA. CODE ch. 37, art. 6, § 14 (Michie 1966).
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may be levied and sold for the payment of rent allegedly in arrears.
Procedural due process is founded upon the concept of "how" the
state does some act or sanctions the action of a private individual,
and is not necessarily related to "what" the state can or cannot do,
or to what substantive rights an individual may have.'
Procedural due process in matters of a noncriminal nature has
been increasingly used by the federal courts in recent years to hold
certain state laws and procedures unconstitutional. 6 In Sniadach
v. Family Finance Corporation/ the Supreme Court held that
Wisconsin's procedure of pre-judgment garnishment of a debtor's
wages was unconstitutional in the absence of notice and a hearing
prior to the freezing of the debtor's wages.' Sniadach is important
5

233 (1962).
early as 1863 the Supreme Court articulated that procedural due
process meant that an individual had a right to "notice and an opportunity to
be heard" before he could be deprived of life, liberty or property. Baldwin
v. Hole 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1863). The Court felt:
Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and
in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.
Common justice requires that no man shall be condemned in his
person or property without notice and an opportunity to make his
defence.
In Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 246 (1944), Mr.
Chief Justice Stone speaking for the majority noted that: "[t]he fundamental
requirement of due process is an opportunity to be heard upon such notice
and proceedings as are adequate to safeguard the right for which the constitutional protection is invoked." The Court has further articulated these
principles of procedural due process in Best v. Humbolt Mining Co., 371
U.S. 334 (1963), and Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306
(1950). For more recent cases concerned with procedural due process in noncriminal actions, see Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337
(1969); Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D. N.Y.
1970); Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp, 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970). Mr. Justice
Harlan, concurring in Sniadach, stated that procedural due process "limits state
action by norms of fundamental fairness" which does not emanate solely from
the constitution, but also embodies the spirit of our Anglo-American legal
heritage. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969). See
also, Note, Attachment and Garnishment-ConstitutionalLaw-Due Process
of Law, 68 MICH. L. Rv. 986, 990 (1970); 5 U. RICH. L. Rlv. 447, 449
(1971).
7 395 U.S. 337 (1969), commented on in 72 W. VA. L. REv. 165 (1970).
1 Mr. Justice Douglas in his majority opinion relied heavily upon
Schroeder v. New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962), and Mullane v. Central Hanover
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). The Court in Schroeder held that notice
to riparian owners through newspaper publications and posting on nearby
trees along the river by respondent who instituted proceedings to divert a
river twenty-five miles upstream from petitioner's home was insufficient to
meet the requirements of due process. In Mullane, the Court recognizing that
an opportunity to be heard is fundamental to due process, noted that "[this
right to be heard has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the
matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to appear or default,
acquiesce or contest." 339 U.S. at 314.
A.

BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH

6As
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because it was the first time procedural due process was used by the
Court to strike down a state law which permitted the owner to be
deprived of the use of his property without a prior hearing even
though the deprivation was temporary and a subsequent hearing
guaranteed.9 Like Wisconsin's pre-judgment garnishment of wages,
the distress for rent law in West Virginia also provides for the seizure
of the tenant's property without notice and a hearing; however, the
loss in West Virginia is likely to be permanent, and there is no
guarantee of an eventual hearing.
Subsequent to Sniadach, the requirements of procedural due process have been implemented by the Supreme Court and lower federal
courts in other actions of a non-criminal nature. Following the
Sniadach reasoning, the Court in Goldberg v. Kelly'" held that a state
(New York in this instance) could not terminate public assistance
benefits without first providing notice and pre-termination evidentiary
hearing. Once the state undertakes to give an individual benefits
through legislation, these statutory entitlements, whether classified
as "property" or not, cannot be taken away unless the state first
observes certain procedures to guarantee fairness." In Laprease
v. Raymours FurnitureCompany,'2 a district court held New York's
replevin statute governing a creditor's seizure of an alleged debtor's
property without notice and a hearing violative of procedural due
process. The procedure was declared unconstitutional even though
the creditor had to post a bond and the debtor could have stopped
9'
83 R-nmv. L. Ruv. 113 (1970).
10 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280 (1970)
(companion case decided concurrently with Goldberg v. Kelly).
IMr. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in Kelly, observed that
a recipient has a constitutional right to a "pre-termination evidentiary hearing." Although the Court did not denominate welfare assistance as "property,"
(as suggested by Professor Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733
(1964)), it did say termination of welfare is different from the termination of
other forms of governmental entitlements (e.g., a blacklisted government
contractor, a discharged government employee or a mere taxpayer denied a
tax exemption). A welfare recipient who loses his government assistance
is injured and adversely affected to a higher degree (loss of means to survive)
than people receiving other types of statutory entitlements. Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970). But see Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960)
(old-age, survivor and disability payments under the Social Security Act were
held not to be "accrued" property interest within the context of due process).
See 84 HALv. L. Rav. 100, 104 (1970) (from Nestor to Kelly, the Court
changed its attitude toward statutory entitlements). A state that requires
its residents who own and drive motor vehicles to have a driver's license
and automobile registration (statutory entitlement) cannot suspend an uninsured motorist's license or registration if he was involved in an accident without
first serving notice and holding a hearing to determine who was probably at
fault. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
12315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
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the sheriff from delivering the goods to the creditor by making a
proper motion and showing a meritorious defense to the court. 3
West Virginia's present distress law appears to be in conflict with
the trend of modem day courts to extend the protection of procedural
due process in order to strike down the state sanction of procedures
which summarily adjudicate important individual interests. 4
I.

PROCEDURE OF A DISTRESS WARRANT-HOW A WEST VIRGINIA
LANDLORD COLLECTS UNPAID RENT

In West Virginia, a landlord has two remedies available to
recover unpaid rent: a civil action at law, 5 or distress. 6 If the rent
is not paid, the landlord has one year to seek a distress warrant from
a justice of the peace in the county wherein the tenant's chattels may
be found." The landlord need not serve notice upon the tenant, and
the justice is not required to hold a prior hearing before issuing the
11 Beds, stoves, mattresses, dishes, tables, and other necessaries for
ordinary day-to-day living are, like wages in Sniadach, a "specialized
type of property presenting distinct problems in our economic system,"
the taking of which on the unilateral command of an adverse party
"may impose tremendous hardships" on purchasers of these essentials.
That it is a temporary taking, does not obviate the objection that
it is a taking prior to hearing and notice.
Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716, 722 (N.D.N.Y.
1970). But see Brunswick Corp. v. J & P, Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970);
Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. Fla. 1970), prob. juris. noted,
401 U.S. 906 (1971) (replevin action pursuant to a conditional sales contract
does not violate conditional buyer's constitutional rights to due process). In
Fuentes, the plaintiff-buyer purchased a gas stove and a stereo set from the
conditional seller but was unable to keep up the payments. The district
court refused to apply Sniadach because it believed the Supreme Court specifically limited Sniadach to a particular kind of property-wages.
14E.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (no summary suspension of
driver's license without a "fault" hearing); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970) (no summary termination of welfare without prior hearing); Sniadach
v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (no summary pre-judgment
garnishment of wages without prior hearing); Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D. N.Y. 1970) (no summary replevy of
debtor's property without prior hearing); Randone v. Appellate Dept. of
Super. Ct. of Sacramento County, 96 Cal. Rptr. 109, 488 P.2d 13 (1971) (no
summary attachment of debtor's property without prior hearing).
1 W. VA. CODE ch. 37, art. 6, § 9 (Michie 1966). Before the promulgation of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, a landlord could
bring a common-law action of assumpsit for the use and occupation of the
leased property. Goshorn v. Steward, 15 W. Va. 657 (1879).
16Distress in Virginia and West Virginia is a remedy afforded by statute
only when rent is due under a contract. See W. VA. CODE ch. 37, art. 6, § 9
(Michie 1966).
,7 W. VA. CODE ch. 37, art. 6, § 12 (Michie 1966). The landlord (or his
agent) must file with the justice an affidavit-a written oath-disclosing
the amount he truthfully believes is due and a description of the property
to be distrained.
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warrant."8 The justice, upon receipt of the landlord's affidavit,
issues a warrant to a sheriff or constable of the county where the

tenant's property may be subjected to distress.' 9 However, the
landlord may distrain only the property of the tenant or his assignee

found on the leased property or removed from it within thirty days
prior to the commencement of the action." ° Note that although there
may be no rent owing, the landlord upon filing an affidavit and
posting bond may institute an attachment of the tenant's property
if he fears that there will not be sufficient property remaining on
the premises to satisfy a distress action for rent accruing within one
year.2
At common law, upon the landlord's seizure of his tenant's
property, the property was held as a pledge to compel the tenant to
pay the rent. However, the landlord could not sell the property and
apply the proceeds of the sale as payment of rent.2 In West Virginia,
the landlord may utilize a distress warrant to compel the sale of the
tenant's distrained property and the rent due may be satisfied out of
the proceeds. 3
18 Id.

A distress warrant is in the nature of an execution against the goods
of the defendant to make the amount of money set forth in the
warrant, and the costs. It is issued without judgment or other
judicial investigation into the liability of the defendant for the amount
claimed. The defense comes afterwards.
E. BURKE, PLEADING AND PRAcTIcE 706 (3d ed. 1938).

19W. VA. CODE ch. 37, art. 6, § 12 (Michie 1966). At early common
law, the feudal landlord's right or remedy was independently vested in himself
without the assistance or sanction of a judicial body or royal official. If
judicial action was necessary to initiate or obviate the landlord's distress for
rent, the assistance came from the lord's own manorial court (commonly
his own bailiff) and not from the royal courts. 1 F. POLLOcK & F. MAITLAND,
THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 575 - 78 (2d ed. 1898).
20 Originally, at common law, all personal property, including a stranger's

property found on the leased premises, was subject to distraint; but in West
Virginia a stranger's chattels or the tenant's chattels, not found on or removed
from the leased premises within thirty days before the commencement of the
distress action, are not subject to distraint for rent. See W. VA. CODE ch.
37, art. 6, § 13 (Michie 1966); General Electric Co. v. Martin, 99 W. Va.
519, 130 S.E. 299 (1925). See also 3 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
589 (3d ed. 1939).
2' W. VA. CoDE ch. 37, art. 6, § 17 (Michie 1966).
22 3 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 589 (3d ed. 1939).
2311Thus there are two important differences between common-law distress for rent and distress in West Virginia: (1) at common law the landlord
or his personal servant (e.g., his baliff) could seize the tenant's chattels, but
in West Virginia a justice must issue a distress warrant and a sheriff or constable must seize the property; and (2) at common law, the seized property
was held as security for payment of debt, but in West Virginia the distrained
property is seized for the purpose of sale.
Once the property has been seized under a distress warrant, the officer
may fix a date and time for sale at public auction to the highest bidder by
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If the tenant wishes to contest the validity of the landlord's right
to recover or retain possession of his property, he must post with the
officer a forthcoming bond.24 In Virginia, if the tenant has a
meritorious defense, but is unable to post bond, he may still retain
possession of the levied chattels by submitting an affidavit.25 How-

ever, in West Virginia, if the tenant cannot post the forthcoming
bond, the officer serving the distress warrant must seize the property
even though the tenant may have a meritorious defense.
HI.

THE DISTRESS WARRANT AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

West Virginia's Supreme Court of Appeals was confronted with
the question of whether West Virginia's distress for rent law violated
the fourteenth amendment and held that the due process clause of
that amendment was not adopted with the design to invalidate
established common-law remedies and procedures in general and
distress for rent in particular.2" The Court accepted the traditional
posting notice of the sale (ten days in advance) on a door of the county
courthouse and in a public place near the tenant's residence if he lives in
that county. W. VA. CODE ch. 37, art. 6, § 16 (Michie 1966). If the distrained property is perishable or by nature expensive to keep, an accelerated
sale may be ordered after the tenant has been notified. W. VA. CODE ch. 38,
art. 6, § 8 (Michie 1966). The tenants tools of his trade may be exempted
from the levy and certain dependents of a deceased tenant may also take
an exemption.
W. VA. CODE ch. 38, art. 8, § 1 (Michie 1966).
24
W. VA. CODE ch. 38, art. 6, § 7 (Michie 1966). The forthcoming
bond is usually set at double the value of the property levied and not twice
the amount claimed by the landlord.
25 VA. CODE § 55-232 (Michie 1969). The officer returns the warrant
and tenant's affidavit to the circuit court. The landlord, after serving the
tenant ten days notice, may make a motion in the circuit court for a judgment
on the rent and an order to sell the tenant's property, and the tenant may
present his defenses. The landlord may also post bond (twice the value of
the property) requiring the officer to seize the property and hold it pending
the outcome
of the action.
26
Anderson v. Henry, 45 W. Va. 319, 31 S.E. 998 (1898). Anderson
involved a controversy over preference of the landlord's power to distrain
the tenant's goods for rent and a general creditor's power to reach the tenantdebtor's goods to satisfy a debt. The court held that the landlord's claim for
rent had priority for one year's rent over a general creditor's claim for a
debt. See W. VA. CODE ch. 37, art. 6, § 18 (Michie 1966).
Judge Brannon writing for the majority in Anderson stated that:
[i]t is urged that this proceeding is in violation of amendment 14
of the Constitution of the United States, guarantying due process
of law. The remedy of distress existed before the discovery of
America, and was brought to Virginia by Capt. Smith, and has never
ceased; and it seems useless to argue to show that a remedy so
long antedating said amendment, a remedy for and against all
alike, is not destroyed by it. That amendment is not the "scarecrow"
it is often represented to be; it does not overthrow state laws, rights
and remedies, to the extent and purposes for which it is often cited.
It respects the common law, the statute, the remedies and procedure
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view that common-law distress for rent is not a civil action between
adversaries but is only an ex parte proceeding, and the justice provides only a ministerial service, not a judicial act." However, in a
recent decision,28 a United States district court held that Sniadach29
was clearly applicable to the Pennsylvania law setting forth the
remedy of distress for rent. The court held the Pennsylvania distraint
procedure did not meet the requirements of procedural due process.
Defendant claimed that the taking was under the lease agreement"
and thus no state action was involved." However, the taking of
the tenant's personal property through a distraint action by the landlord involves state action because the state furnishes the landlord with
the remedy of distress32 and state officials conduct the public
existing in the state at its adoption ....
It came to preserve not to
destroy, existing rights. Just as well say that the tax bill seizing
a horse for taxes is not due process of law.
Anderson v. Henry, 45 W. Va. 319, 325, 31 S.E. 998, 1000 (1898).
27 The landlord in exercising the remedy of distraint does not commence
a civil action but merely seeks a warrant from the justice to seize his tenant's
chattels and then sell them for collection of his rent. Furthermore, as
proof that a distraint proceeding is not a civil action, the court reasoned
that since there is no hearing prior to the issuance of the warrant, there is
therefore no suit per se between the parties. 45 W. Va. at 324, 31 S.E. at
1000. But even if the distraint proceeding is only an administrative proceeding,
the tenant ought to be protected by procedural due process. Goldberg v.
Kelly,28 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970). Plaintiffs,
Santiago and others, instituted this action challenging the constitutionality of
levies and sales pursuant to the procedure of distress for unpaid rent under
the Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951, 68 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68 § 250.302 et
seq. (West 1965). Plaintiffs lived in rented housing and their only income
was a public assistance grant. Their landlord brought a distress action against
them for alleged nonpayment of rent although the rent had been raised
without
2 9 giving the plaintiffs notice as required in the lease.
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
30 The lease (a standard form) provided that the tenant agreed to permit
the landlord to act pursuant to distraint for rent procedures set forth in The
Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68 §§ 250.302-313
(West 1965). The court disagreed with the defendant's contention that this
provision created an independent right in the landlord to distrain. Although
the tenant agreed not to object on legal grounds to the distress procedure, the
tenant did not waive an objection on constitutional grounds unless it could
be said that he intentionally waived a known right; the court cited Johnson v.
Derbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
3"Because the purported waiver only related to objections on legal
grounds to distress procedures and the standard form lease was a contract
of adhesion ("take it or leave it" situation), the court held that there was
no waiver by plaintiffs of their right to object on constitutional grounds to
distress procedures set forth by statute.
32 Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
California's Innkeepers Lien Law wihch did not provide for a prior hearing before the imposition of an innkeeper's lien was held to be a taking of the boarder's
property without due process of law. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
(1967). See also 5 U. RicH. L. RPv. 447 (1971).
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sales.3" Thus, if Sniadach is applicable to the remedy of distress34
(Santiago v. McElroy said it was), procedural due process requires
the state to give the tenant some form of notice and a prior hearing.
The Court in Sniadach also looked to the nature of the taking.
The petititioner-alleged debtor was deprived of the use of part
of her wages pending the outcome of respondent's action. If the
debtor ultimately prevails, he is still temporarily deprived of his
earnings, and even a temporary loss of a small part of his wages can
create a hardship on a wage-earner and his family. The landlord
under Pennsylvania's distress for rent statute could distrain the tenant's
personal property for collection of the alleged rent through public
sale, and ff the tenant challenged the distress warrant by an action
of trespass, there might not be a court decision until after the sale.
Furthermore, from the time of the seizure until the sale the tenant
is temporarily deprived of the use of his property. If the tenant should
prevail in the trespass action after the sale, he is then permanently
deprived of his property in kind. If the tenant brings a replevin
suit and retains possession of his property, he is still temporarily
deprived of the use of the money relinquished for his replevin bond
(forthcoming bond in West Virginia) pending the outcome of the
5
litigation. As the court noted in Santiago,"
tenants through any of
these deprivations are condemned to suffer an injustice which could
have catastrophic results.
III. CONCLUSION

West Virginia's statute setting forth the landlord's remedy of
distraint of his tenant's goods for collection of rent represents an
outdated vestige of the feudal lord's power to force his tenants to pay
their rent. Today, through state machinery, the landlord may seize
his tenant's personal property, sell it, and keep the proceeds without
having a judicial determination of any kind to decide whether there
are rents actually due. West Virginia's distress for rent law, as
Wisconsin's garnishment statute before Sniadach v. Family Finance
11 Monroe v. Pope, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
34 If
the Supreme Court in Sniadach was more concerned with the
unconstitutional taking of a special type of property-a prejudgment freeze
of a man's wages--than with deciding whether state action violated the wageearner's right to due process (a point rejected in Klein v. Jones, 315 F. Supp.
109 at 122 (N.D. Cal. 1970)), still the taking of the tenant's personal property
under a distraint action when rent is due (usually because he is too poor
to pay) without the protections inherent in procedural due process should bring
the distress procedure within the sphere of SnIadach.
3- 319 F. Supp. at 294.
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Corp.,3 6 permits the summary procedure for seizing the alleged

debtor's property. Although the Supreme Court in Sniadach was
critical of the taking of a specialized type of property-i.e., wages
-it is not without basis to extend the reasoning of Sniadach to other
forms of pre-judgment seizures of a debtor's property. In addition to
Santiago v. McElroy, 7 extending the Sniadach principle to Pennsylvania's distress for rent law, the Sniadach reasoning has recently been
applied to California's attachment procedure" and claim and delivery remedy."9
Nor does West Virginia's distress law seem justifiable as the
legislature's legitimate attempt to protect some "compelling state
interest." 4° Usually compelling state interest will justify summary
proceedings only when necessary for the protection of the publics
health and welfare e.g., summary seizure of a mislabled vitamin
product,41 adoption of wartime price controls,4 2 seizure and destruction of contaminated food,4 ' and the revocation of a doctor's surgical
44
privileges.
Although Sniadach suggests that a summary proceeding may be
constitutional if there is an extraordinary situation in which the
state has a special interest ("compelling state interest") to protect
and the statute is narrowly drawn to meet that situation, the state
may have a difficult task to show that distraint of the tenant's property
is an extraordinary situation justifying the pre-judgment taking. As
the wages in Sniadach and the household goods in Laprease,45 a
tenant's personal property may be special property deserving the
same protection of procedural due process. Perhaps pre-judgment
36

395 U.S. 337 (1969).

319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
38 Randone v. Appellate Dept. of Super. Ct. of Sacramento County,
Cal 3d .. 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971).
37

--

39
4 0 Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
Traditionally, the courts will not sanction the government's summary
adjudication of an individual's rights in the absence of a showing by the
state of some compelling need or interest. The Supreme Court found this
"compelling state interest" in Ewing v. Mytinger & Cassalbury, Inc., 339
U.S. 599 (1950); Fohey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931); Coffin Brothers & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29
(1928). See 17 U.C.L.A. L. Rlv. 837, 842 (1970) (these cases generally
involve the actions of governmental administrative agencies, and in none of
them were the petitioners affected by severe economic hardships typical in
Sniadach, Kelly, and Santiago). See also 73 W. VA. L. Rav. 80, 85 (1970).
41 Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
42Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
43
North Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
44 Coach v. State, 165 So. 2d 426 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
45 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
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distress for rent would be constitutional if it was patterned after
West Virginia's attachment statute 46 requiring the landlord to post
a bond and show the existence of an extraordinary situation requiring
the state to protect his right to collect the rent. But if the tenant believes he has a meritorious defense, he should have an opportunity to
assert that defense before his property may be taken.
As a practical matter, the harshness of the distress law, as
evidenced in Santiago, usually strikes at the poor who are forced by
necessity to live in rental housing. The landlord through the state can
force the seizure and sale of his tenant's chattels without the tenant
realistically having the right or the means to resist the unlawful taking
of his property. Cognizant of the landlord's substantive right to
collect rent for the use of his property, the legislature should amend
the distress law and provide the machinery for the constitutional
protections that procedural due process requires. Before a tenant's
goods may be seized and sold for the collection of rent, he should be
provided with notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
Anything short of this represents a departure from a standard of
"fundamental fairness"47 and deprives a tenant of the procedural due
process safeguards to which he is constitutionally entitled.
William Charles Garrett

46

4

W. VA. CODE ch. 50, art. 9, § 1 (Michie 1966).

Mr. Justice Harlan in a concurring opinion in Sniadach stressed that
the states should act with "fundamental fairness" and at least require notice
and prior hearing. In Boddie v. Conn., 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (a welfare
recipient has a right to a divorce even if he cannot afford the cost of commencing the divorce action), Mr. Justice Harlan articulated the basic requirements of procedural due process, concluding that "a state must afford to all
individuals a meaningful opportunity to be heard if it is to fulfill the promise
of the Due Process Clause. Id. at 379. This does not mean, however, a full
evidentiary hearing on the merits in every civil case. Mr. Justice Harlan affirmed the position that the Court had taken in the past that a default judgment would be proper if the defendant failed to appear after receiving notice,
Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 278 (1876), or without justifiable excuse
failed to produce evidence necessary for orderly adjudication, Hammond
Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 121 U.S. 322, 351 (1909).
1
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